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THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY'S NEW ROBES
WILLIAM C. DUNCAN
INTRODUCTION
The emperor in Hans Christian Andersen's story, "The Emperor's New
Clothes," is fooled into parading down the street without a stitch on (or, in
some illustrations, in a demure pair of boxer shorts perhaps decorated with
heart patterns). The effectiveness of the tailors' ruse was that the vanity of
the emperor, courtiers and nearly all the unnamed kingdom's subjects
prevented them from admitting they could not see the clothes they had been
convinced could be seen only by those fit for office or not "incorrigibly
stupid."I In the story's denouement, a little child witnessing the parade
cries out: "But he has nothing on!"2
In August 2010, a U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California decided that Proposition 8, California's marriage amendment,
violated various provisions of the U.S. Constitution and was, therefore,
invalid.3 The court's decision is curiously reminiscent of the royal outfit of
Hans Andersen's tale. This article will describe the similarities.
I. WHAT'S MISSING?
In the court's decision, the suspicion of stark absences is raised at the
very outset; in fact, in the caption of the case. There we see that two same-
sex couples have sued the governor of the state. Yet, in no time we learn:
"With the exception of the Attorney General, who concedes that
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional, the government defendants refused to
take a position on the merits of plaintiffs' claims and declined to defend
Proposition 8."4 So, the first thing missing is the government's defense of
I Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor's New Clothes in FOLK-LORE & FABLE 237 (The Harvard
Classics 1937).
2 Id. at 238.
3 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
4 Id. at 928.
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its law duly enacted according to constitutional procedures. 5 This is not a
minor omission. If government officials can refuse to discharge their
responsibilities and, thus, accomplish what they are not granted authority to
do and what they failed to do in their opposition to voter approval of the
amendment, the state constitution's procedure for amendment would be a
dead letter since the state constitution would always be prey to collusion
between government attorneys (who opt for inaction in defense of an
approved measure) and an activist judiciary.
Strangely, the court allowed in an extra plaintiff, the City and County of
San Francisco, but refused to allow another municipality, Imperial County,
to intervene in defense of the law.6
Another startling instance of, absence is the nearly total lack of
recognition of contrary legal authority. Most striking is the opinion's
failure to address controlling precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court. In
Baker v. Nelson, the Court dismissed a federal constitutional challenge
(raising the same issues as the Proposition 8 challenge) to Minnesota's
marriage law brought by a same-sex couple.7 The dismissal was for want of
a substantial federal question, which is a ruling on the merits.8 Given that
the decision was a summary adjudication and occurred three decades ago, it
is not inconceivable that the court might have decided that it did not have
the weight a fully adjudicated case would have, but it is exceedingly odd
that the court did not even acknowledge the existence of the decision.
Similarly, the court did not acknowledge contrary precedent in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In a constitutional challenge to
Nebraska's marriage amendment, a unanimous panel concluded: "We
cannot conclude that the State's justification [for a "government interest in
'steering procreation into marriage"'] 'lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests."' 9 It ignored, as well, a number of federal district
court decisions coming to the opposite conclusion about the
constitutionality of state marriage laws.10
Given the court's conclusion that Proposition 8 advanced no legitimate
5 See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 100-01 (Cal. 2009).
6 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
7 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1972), dismissed for lack of substantial federal
question, 409 U.S. 810 (1973).
8 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
9 Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 632 (1996)).
10 Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 880 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980),
aff'd 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 147-48 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Wash. 2004).
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interests, it is surprising that the court did not note significant state high
court decisions finding just such interests. For instance, the New York
Court of Appeals decision that the state legislature could "rationally decide
that, for the welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability,
and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships" and
that "it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both
a mother and a father."II The Maryland Court of Appeals similarly said:
"We agree that the State's asserted interest in fostering procreation is a
legitimate governmental interest."l 2
The Washington Supreme Court upheld that state's marriage law holding
it was constitutional "because the legislature was entitled to believe that
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers procreation, essential to
survival of the human race, and furthers the well-being of children by
encouraging families where children are reared in homes headed by the
children's biological parents."' 3
Of course, the court is not bound by these decisions but it is odd that it
did not recognize the entirely apposite conclusions they contained.
II. FACT FINDING
This article will not discuss what is absent in the court's legal
conclusions. At any rate, the legal analysis of the court offered little that
was new. Other courts have rejected the specific arguments that state
marriage laws discriminate on the basis of sex, 14 others have rejected the
idea that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right,' 5 and a series of state
high courts have soundly rejected the idea that the state has no rational
basis for defining marriage as the union of a husband and wife.16
The court's conclusion that sexual orientation discrimination and sex
discrimination are synonymous is quite novel (perhaps wildly so).17 This,
like most of the court's other constitutional conclusions, is not necessary to
the court's final decision. However, it became important because the court
ultimately holds that regardless of the nature of the right or the class
11 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
12 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630 (Md. 2007).
13 Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006).
14 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 n.Il (Mass. 2003); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 438-40 (Cal.
2008).
15 See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 1.
16 See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963
(Wash. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2006).
17 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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affected, Proposition 8 would be unconstitutional because it is utterly
lacking in any rational basis and must thus be understood as a mere act of
spite.18
The real novelty of the decision, of course, is the extensive fact-finding
based on a lengthy trial.
A trial does not seem to have been intended by the parties to the lawsuit
but was rather suggested by the court itself.19 However, the spectacle the
court had in mind was grander than the actual event. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was first to put a damper on the contemplated
festivities by reversing an order to the proponents of Proposition 8 to
disclose internal campaign documents. 20 The court said the proponents had
"shown that discovery would likely have a chilling effect on political
association and the formulation of political expression" and there was no
"sufficiently compelling need" for disclosure of the internal
communications plaintiffs sought.21
The U.S. Supreme Court also weighed in on the spectacle aspect of the
trial when it ruled the trial would not be the first federal trial to be
broadcast on television and the internet. 22 The Court said the "balance of
equities" between the advocates for and against the broadcast favored the
defenders of Proposition 8 because they "have demonstrated the threat of
harm they face if the trial is broadcast" (the possibility of harassment and
persecution of witnesses) while the plaintiffs "have not alleged any harm if
the trial is not broadcast." 23 The Court concluded the trial court "attempted
to change its rules at the eleventh hour to treat this case differently than
other trials in the district. Not only did it ignore the federal statute that
establishes the procedures by which it rules may be amended, its express
purpose was to broadcast a high- profile trial that would include witness
testimony about a contentious issue." 24
The trial that did occur, though scaled down in dramatic effect, became
the cornerstone of the court's decision regarding the constitutionality of
Proposition 8. In fact, in the decision the court equated trial witnesses to
evidence though the concepts are, of course, distinct. 25 The long trial has
18 Id. at 1002.
19 See Dahlia Lithwick, A Brilliant Ruling, SLATECOM (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.slate.com/id/2262766/.
20 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 27064 (9th Cir. 2010).
21 Id. at 42.
22 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010).
23 Id. at 713.
24 Id. at 714-15.
25 Perry v. Swarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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been seized on by the decision's defenders who argue that it shows that
there was no real evidence in favor of the constitutionality of Proposition
8.26 The factual findings made by the court on the basis of the trial
testimony are the fancy dress on the constitutional conclusion that
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional and thus any marriage law based on the
complementarity of husband and wife must be invalidated.
Perhaps because so few people saw the trial, it should not be surprising
that one of its really salient characteristics has not been widely noted. That
fact is that the court's extensive factual findings based on the trial contain
little substance. Like the boy in the fable, looking at the decision allows us
to see that there's really nothing there.
At first glance, the factual findings of the court are unlike the outfit in
Andersen's fable in that the conclusions are certainly substantial. The
eighty findings occupy fifty-six pages of the 136 page opinion (contrasted
with twenty-seven pages for legal analysis). Most findings are buttressed
by citations to the trial or other evidence. A close examination of this
factual fabric, however, reveals that it is a tissue of inapposite uses of
authority, irrelevant statements, and non-factual "facts."
III. AUTHORITY
In the first finding regarding the legal principle of coverture, the court
cites California's attorney general as authority who, the court says, "admits
that the doctrine of coverture, under which women, once married, lost their
independent legal identity and became the property of their husbands, was
once viewed as a central component of the civil institution of marriage." 27
It may be true that the attorney general believes this, but on what basis are
we to credit this belief? The court had already noted the attorney general
believes Proposition 8 is unconstitutional but that hardly ended the court's
analysis. Is there some reason to believe California's attorney general will
have special information about century-old attitudes about the centrality of
various ideas about marriage? This particular attorney general has argued
that the California [] contains unwritten mandates that trump specific
constitutional language to the contrary but even the California Supreme
Court did not buy that.28
Throughout the opinion, the court relied heavily on statements of
26 Chuleenan Svetvilas, Challenging Prop 8: The Hidden Story, CALIFORNIA LAWYER (Jan. 2010),
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=906575&evid= 1.
27 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
28 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 117-18 (Cal. 2009).
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professional organizations to support its findings.29 The American
Psychiatric Association statement referenced by the court is, as the court
notes, a "Position" statement rather than a scholarly article. The sources
cited in the statement are all other policy documents rather than research
findings. The American Medical Association policy document is devoid of
citations.
Similar organizational statements relied on by the court are also
problematic. The statements of the American Anthropological Association
and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry30 are
devoid of citations. The groups issuing many of these statements typically
endorse a range of causes to which social science considerations are
tangential at best.31 They have also been subjected to criticism within their
ranks.32 The scientific accuracy of a statement by the American Academy
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry was highlighted in testimony in the
Proposition 8 trial. After reading the Academy's statement that "[1]esbian,
gay, bisexual or transgender people have faced more rigorous scrutiny than
heterosexual people regarding their rights to be or become parents," an
attorney for Proponents asked a plaintiffs' expert: "Dr. Lamb, there is not a
rich empirical literature relating to child outcomes of transgender
individuals, is that right?" Dr. Lamb responded, "I'm not familiar with it,
no." The attorney then asked, "[a]nd there is not a rich literature on the
child outcomes of the children of bisexuals, correct?" Dr. Lamb
responded, "That's correct." The attorney then stated the obvious
conclusion: "So this statement is not based in empirics, but, rather, in
politics, correct?" Dr. Lamb concurred: "Well, I can't speak to the basis.
That would be my understanding, yes." 33
29 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 3:09-cv-02292 (Dist. N. Cal. 2010) slip op. at 84, 92 (citing a
"Position Statement" of the American Psychiatric Association for the proposition that children of same-
sex couples are harmed because the couple cannot marry) (citing an American Medical Association
"Policy" that same-sex couples experience health disparities as a result of the current definition of
marriage).
30 American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Gay Lesbian, Bisexual, or Transgender
Parents Policy Statement (October 2008), available at
http://www.aacap.org/cs/root/policystatements/gay lesbian transgender and bisexual_parents policy
statement.
31 The American Anthropological Association has positions on boycotting the state of Arizona
(http://www.aaanet.org/issues/press/Arizona-Immigration.cfn) and the American Medical Association
on abortion, global warming, recycling, gun control and others (http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/15/digest of actions.pdf).
32 See Peter Wood, The Marriage Debate Goes Multicultural, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (April
26, 2005), available at http://old.nationalreview.com/comment/wood2005042608l0.asp (criticizing the
American Anthropological Association statement); Letters to the Editor 110 PEDIATRICS 408 & 419
(2002) (publishing letters critical of the American Academy of Pediatrics' 2002 statement).
33 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Trial Transcript at 1052-54 (Jan. 15, 2010).
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There are many problems endemic in a reliance on these kinds of
professional organization statements. Dr. Daniel Robinson points out:
"Even when there is relevant expertise within the discipline of psychology
there is no a priori basis upon which to credit a given Board or Council
with possession of it. Scholars and scientists do not vote on matters of fact,
nor do they install theories into positions of supremacy by fiat."34 This is
true because "[m]oral authority does not inhere in committees, boards,
councils, or memberships, but in the weight of reason attached to
arguments for and against actions of a certain kind."35
To take another example, the findings of the court regarding child
outcomes relied heavily, almost exclusively, on one expert witness and on a
document produced by the American Psychological Association.36 This
APA document, however, does not contain citations and admits to serious
limitations. The four findings that proceed the language quoted by the
court say that (1) sexual identities of "children of lesbian mothers" develop
similarly to those of heterosexual parents though "[flew studies are
available regarding children of gay fathers", (2) children of lesbian mothers
have few differences in personality development than children of
heterosexual parents (with the same note about the lack of studies of gay
fathers), (3) children of gay parents have normal social relationships, and
(4) children of gay parents are not more likely to be sexually abused.37
Then, based on this thin record, it comes to the conclusion quoted by the
court below which conflates "lesbian and gay parents" even though the
statements note a dearth of research about the latter. This hardly promotes
confidence in the "scientific" nature of the assertions.
IV. IRRELEVANCE
In describing the evidentiary presentations, the court says "[p]roponents'
evidentiary presentation was dwarfed by that of plaintiffs" without
explaining the relevance of the observation. Perhaps this is because the
bulk of assertions about a matter are really irrelevant to their accuracy. A
defense attorney who brings hundreds of witnesses in a criminal matter will
have a hard time prevailing on a jury to accept her client's innocence if
34 Daniel N. Robinson, Ethics and Advocacy, 39 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 787, 788 (1984).
35 Robinson, supra note 33, at 792.
36 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-02292, slip op. at 95-96 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4,2010).
37 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, Answers to Your Questions For a Better
Understanding of Sexual Orientation & Homosexuality 5, available at
http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/sorientation.pdf. One wonders if any of these points was even in
dispute.
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there is only one piece of evidence on the other side and that evidence is a
video recording of the client clearly committing the crime.
At a number of points, the court raises the specter of anti-miscegenation
laws. Finding #23, for instance, makes the uncontroversial assertion that
marriage requires consent of the parties. The court then adds this
unnecessary illustration (particularly unnecessary since the main point was
not in contention): "Because slaves were considered property of others at
the time, they lacked the legal capacity to consent and were thus unable to
marry. After emancipation, former slaves viewed their ability to marry as
one of the most important new rights they had gained." 38 Finding #24 notes
that many states "had laws restricting the race of marital partners so that
whites and non-whites could not marry each other" 39 Since Proposition 8
had absolutely nothing to do with racial restrictions, what would be the
relevance of these points? There is, of course, no direct relevance and one
is left to assume that these points are raised only to tar opposition to same-
sex marriage with the brush of bigotry by associating that position with
racist opposition to interracial marriage.
Something similar seems to be at work with the next set of findings.
Finding #26 describes, of all things, the doctrine of coverture. 40 Finding
#27 argues: "Marriage between a man and a woman was traditionally
organized based on presumptions of a division of labor along gender lines.
Men were seen as suited for certain types of work and women for others.
Women were seen as suited to raise children and men were seen as suited
to provide for the family."4 1 Of course, Proposition 8 says nothing about
men or women's suitability for employment or what tasks men and women
should perform in a marriage. The race and gender analogy is raised again
in Finding #33, "eliminating gender and race restrictions in marriage has
not deprived the institution of marriage of its validity," 42 and in the court's
legal analysis "[r]ace restrictions on marital partners were once common in
most states but are now seen as archaic, shameful or even bizarre." 43
Finding #47 is another example of irrelevance. It says: "California has
no interest in asking gays and lesbians to change their sexual orientation or
in reducing the number of gays and lesbians in California." 44 On seeing
38 Perry, at 61.
39 Id
40 Id at 62.
41 Id at 63.
42 Id at 66.
43 Id at 112.
44 Id. at 76.
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this, a reader might well ask if anyone had argued that the state of
California did have such an interest. This is not part of the Proponents'
case but instead is a straw man created by the court.
Some irrelevant findings are more subtle. Finding #48 reads:
Same-sex couples are identical to opposite-sex couples in the
characteristics relevant to the ability to form successful marital unions.
Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples have happy, satisfying
relationships and form deep emotional bonds and strong commitments to
their partners. Standardized measures of relationship satisfaction,
relationship adjustment and love do not differ depending on whether a
couple is same-sex or opposite-sex. 45
This is all well and good but it has nothing to do with the state's interest
in Proposition 8. The court does not claim that Proponents supported the
amendment as a way of preventing unhappy marriages.
Similarly, #51 says: "Marrying a person of the opposite sex is an
unrealistic option for gay and lesbian individuals." 46 Again, there's no
indication that Proponents supported Proposition 8 as a way of encouraging
gay men to marry women or lesbian women to marry men, so what is the
relevance of a finding that the law would not do what it was not intended to
do in the first place?
Finding #53 argues, as a way of supporting the idea that same-sex
couples are disadvantaged in a tangible way by being given all of the
benefits of marriage available under state law, but not the formal status,
that: "California domestic partners . . . are not recognized by the federal
government." 47 This may be true but the court does not note that if
marriage were redefined in California to include same-sex couples, the
state would also not recognize that marriage because the federal Defense of
Marriage Act precludes such recognition. 48
Another set of irrelevant findings concern economic issues. Finding #64
says "Proposition 8 has had a negative fiscal impact on California and local
governments." 49 Finding #65 says the City and County of San Francisco
45 Id. at 77.
46 Id. at 79.
47 Id. at 8 1.
48 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) ("[T]he word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) ("No State ... shall be required
to give effect to any public act, record or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State").
49 Perry, at 90.
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"would benefit economically if Proposition 8 were not in effect."O Finding
#66 says: "Proposition 8 increases costs and decreases wealth for same-sex
couples because of increased tax burdens, decreased availability of health
insurance and higher transactions costs to secure rights and obligations
typically associated with marriage." 51 Assuming each of these propositions
is true, what would that have to do with the constitutionality of Proposition
8? There is no constitutional mandate to do what is best fiscally for San
Francisco or California. On any law, its supporters can validly decide that
some kinds of costs are justified by different kinds of benefits. The court's
tax law discussion is particularly inapposite since some tax laws will
benefit the married while others will create an advantage for unmarried
couples.52 This is the regular give-and-take of the legislative process.
In Finding #75, the court notes, "Public and private discrimination
against gays and lesbians occurs in California and in the United States." 53
The court immediately notes that Proponents do not dispute this. That is
hardly surprising since the existence of discrimination does not mean that
every law affecting a group that experiences discrimination is itself
discriminatory. Similarly, Finding #76 says that "[w]ell-known stereotypes
about gay men and lesbians include a belief that gays and lesbians are
affluent, self-absorbed and incapable of forming long-term intimate
relationships. Other stereotypes imagine gay men and lesbians as disease
vectors or as child molesters who recruit young children into
homosexuality." 54 The existence of stereotypes does not, however, mean
that they are believed in every instance. The court does not charge, as it
surely would if there were evidence to support the charge, that the
Proponents of Proposition 8 held or disseminated such stereotypes.
Irrelevant assertions are not confined to the formal findings. In its due
process analysis, the court asserts: "Never has the state inquired into
procreative capacity or intent before issuing a marriage license." 55
Certainly, the court must be aware that there might be reasons to avoid
such an inquiry, such as intrusiveness or unreliability, other than that the
state believes that marriage and procreation have no relevance to one
another. If the state really believed this, why would it presume that the
50 Id. at 91.
51 Id.
52 See Theodore Seko, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1529 (2008).
53 Perry v. Swarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
54 Id. at 982-83.
55 Id. at 992.
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husband of a child's mother is the father? If marriage and procreation are
not related, why not just require a blood test to establish every child's
paternity?
As a final example, consider this passage from the court's discussion of
state interests: "One example of a legitimate state interest in not issuing
marriage licenses to a particular group might be a scarcity of marriage
licenses or county officials to issue them." 56 This seems to be a weak
attempt at humor unless the court actually believes that a scarcity of
marriage licenses would be a legitimate state reason for not allowing
people to marry. Following this logic, could a clerk's office just extinguish
the right to marry by refusing to print new marriage licenses? This idea
that the mere existence of a piece of paper called a marriage license is what
makes a marriage is strangely reductionistic. It is like the person who
believes they have money as long as they still have checks to write on. It
also has nothing to do with the proffered justifications for Proposition 8.
V. MISSTATEMENTS
Inaccuracy plagues the court's opinion, and particularly the Findings
section. For space reasons, this article will select only a few examples.
Before the formal list of factual findings begins the reader is tipped off to
the possibility that what follows may be something less that exactly
accurate. The court says: "The key premises on which Proposition 8 was
presented to the voters thus appear to be the following." 57 There follows a
list of straw men arguments that bear little or no relation to the arguments
actually made by the proponents of Proposition 8. These include: "Denial
of marriage to same-sex couples preserves marriage;" and "[d]enial of
marriage to same-sex couples allows ... others, including (perhaps
especially) children, to recognize or acknowledge the existence of same-
sex couples;" and "[s]ame-sex couples' marriages redefine opposite-sex
couples' marriages." 58 These first and last are not really comprehensible
statements, whatever their accuracy. The second statement seems
bizarre-is the court really arguing that people supported Proposition 8 just
to ignore the existence of same-sex couples? Wouldn't it seem that a high-
profile political argument over same-sex marriage would be a poor way to
accomplish that end? This passage is particularly strange given that the
court seems capable of a more accurate summary of the proponents'
56 Id. at 997.
57 Id. at 930.
58 Id.
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position. Thus, contrast, these excerpts of how the proponents' arguments
"appear" to the court with the court's own summary of the case made by
proponents:
Proponents' procreation argument, distilled to its essence, is as follows:
the state has an interest in encouraging sexual activity between people of
the opposite sex to occur in stable marriages because such sexual activity
may lead to pregnancy and children, and the state has an interest in
encouraging parents to raise children in stable households. The state
therefore, the argument goes, has an interest in encouraging all opposite-
sex sexual activity, whether responsible or irresponsible, procreative or
otherwise, to occur within a stable marriage, as this encourages the
development of a social norm that opposite-sex sexual activity should
occur within marriage. Entrenchment of this norm increases the probability
that procreation will occur within a marital union. Because same-sex
couples' sexual activity does not lead to procreation, according to
proponents the state has no interest in encouraging their sexual activity to
occur within a stable marriage. Thus, according to proponents, the state's
only interest is in opposite-sex sexual activity. 59
Notice the dramatic contrast between this summary and the strange
argument that proponents were trying to pretend same-sex couples don't
exist or were arguing that same-sex couples are changing the "definition"
of existing marriages.
Some of the court's findings are hard to reconcile as "facts." Finding
#28, for instance, says the enactment of no-fault divorce laws "allowed
spouses to define their own roles within a marriage." 60 The logic here is
hard to follow. Is the court really saying that men and women couldn't
make decisions about their roles within marriage prior to 1969? The
evidence cited in support of this statement does not support it at any rate.
The sources merely argue that the change in divorce laws "indicates" a
shift in spousal roles or "underlines" that shift; that divorce used to require
fault grounds; and that divorce rates began to rise before the change in the
law.
In Finding #30, the court avers that the legislative history of California's
marriage statute enacted in 1977 "supports a conclusion that unique roles of
a man and a woman in marriage motivated legislators to enact the
amendment." 61 The source for this surprising conclusion (can it really be
59 Id. at 932.
60 Id. at 959.
61 Id at 960.
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the case that the California Legislature in 1977 decided that men ought to
work outside the home and women ought to be homemakers and so decided
to codify this opinion by enacting a law defining marriage as the union of a
husband and wife, the only definition that had ever existed in California
law?) is the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage
Cases.62 The page cited as authority, however does not support this
conclusion. Here is the California Supreme Court's entire discussion of the
legislative history of the 1977 law:
In the mid-1970's, several same-sex couples sought marriage licenses
from county clerks in a number of California counties, relying in part
upon the 1971 change in the language of Civil Code section 4101,
subdivision (a), noted above. All of the county clerks who were
approached by these same-sex couples denied the applications, but in
order to eliminate any uncertainty as to whether the then existing
California statutes authorized marriage between two persons of the
same sex, legislation was introduced in 1977 at the request of the
County Clerks' Association of California to amend the provisions of
sections 4100 and 4101 to clarify that the applicable California
statutes authorized marriage only between a man and a woman. (Stats.
1977, ch. 339, § 1, p. 1295, introduced as Assem. Bill No. 607 (1977-
1978 Reg. Sess.); see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 607 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 23, 1977, p. 1;
Governor's Legal Affairs Off., Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No.
607 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 18, 1977, p. 1.)
The 1977 legislation added the phrase "between a man and a woman" to
the first sentence of former section 4100, so that the sentence read:
"Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a
man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of making
that contract is necessary." The measure also revised the language of
former section 4101 to reintroduce the references to gender that had been
eliminated in 1971. As we explained in Lockyer, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1055,
1076, footnote 11: "The legislative history of the [1977] measure makes its
objective clear. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No.
607 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 23, 1977, p. 1 ['The purpose
of the bill is to prohibit persons of the same sex from entering lawful
marriage'].)" In 1992, when the Family Code was enacted, the provisions
of former sections 4100 and 4101 of the Civil Code, as amended in 1977,
were reenacted without change as Family Code sections 300 and 301,
62 Id
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respectively. (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 10, p. 474.)63
In the finding on the extraterritorial effect of California domestic
partnerships referenced above, the court says: "California domestic partners
may not be recognized in other states and are not recognized by the federal
government." 64 The evidence the court cites in support actually directly
contradicts this statement, noting that "[p]laintiffs and proponents agree
only that Connecticut, New Jersey and Washington recognize California
domestic partnerships" and that the state defendants identified as additional
recognizing jurisdictions Washington D.C., Nevada and New Hampshire. 65
In Finding #55, the court says: "Permitting same-sex couples to marry
will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce,
cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability
of opposite-sex marriages." 66 How this future eventuality can be known
with such certainty is unclear. The evidence cited in support is selective,
focusing on data from Massachusetts (which has only had same-sex
marriage since 2004) and on irrelevant matters such as the fact that other
factors are related to marital stability. The Massachusetts data, of course,
cannot tell us what will happen in the future, only that in a place where
social conditions are very similar there is reason to assume the changes will
not be significant. The court also ignored evidence to the contrary. One of
plaintiffs' witnesses, for instance, testified in the trial that she agreed to the
statement "the social meaning of marriage unquestionably has real world
consequences." 67 This same witness testified that it is impossible to
accurately predict the consequences of mandating same-sex marriage.68
Even the case of Massachusetts is not entirely clear. In 2009, the National
Organization for Marriage commissioned a survey in Massachusetts of
attitudes about marriage five years into that state's experiment with same-
sex marriage. The survey found that "in the five years since gay marriage
became a reality in Massachusetts, support for the idea that the ideal is a
married mother and father dropped from 84 percent to 76 percent." 69
In finding #60, the court says: "Proposition 8 reserves the most socially
63 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 409 (Cal. 2008).
64 Perry 704 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
65 Id. at 971.
66 Id. at 972.
67 Transcript of Record at 311-312, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW).
68 Id. at 254.
69 Five Years After Goodridge: Gay Marriage Divides Massachusetts Voters, THE NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE (May 19, 2009), available at
http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?comL2KeNOLzH&b=5075187&ct-7
000219.
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valued form of relationship (marriage) for opposite-sex couples." 70 The
evidence supported by the court, however, does not support this statement.
The court cites four authorities. One is a study that says more same-sex
couples marry than get domestic partnerships. Another says that many
same-sex couples in a domestic partnership later chose to marry and
another describes a proponent of Proposition 8 expressing a concern that
redefining marriage will affect what is taught about marriage in the public
schools. The fourth source is a book describing interviews with a handful
of Dutch people in which they express their opinion that marriage is
socially valuable.
The next finding, #61, says Proposition 8 codifies "distinct and unique
roles for men and women in marriage." 71 One could read that measure
many, many times and never find anything that suggests that married
women ought to mow lawns and married men ought to sweep the kitchen.
The eleven sources that follow this finding say nothing about this assertion.
They consist of statements that men and women are different and testimony
from one plaintiffs witness that the concept of the traditional family has
been understood in the past to encompass the idea of gender roles.
This same problem afflicts Finding #67, that "Proposition 8 perpetuates
the stereotype that gays and lesbians are incapable of forming long-term
loving relationships and that gays and lesbians are not good parents." 72 The
six sources cited in support include two statements of witnesses that
Proposition 8 creates "structural stigma," two that describe the existence of
stereotypical attitudes, one that relays a concern that Proposition 8 will
affect the teaching of marriage in the public schools, and another that says
that Proposition 8 would send a message that might encourage or at least be
"consistent with holding prejudicial attitudes."73 None of the statements
demonstrate that Proposition 8 "perpetuates stereotypes" and it would be
hard to imagine that it would since it says nothing about same-sex couples.
The findings related to children's outcomes are similarly unsupported.
Finding #69 says "The factors that affect whether a child is well-adjusted
are . . ." and then lists three factors. 74 Is the court really asserting that there
are no other factors in child development? The court then says: "The
gender of a child's parent is not a factor in a child's adjustment." 75 It is not
70 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d. at 974.
71 Id. at 975.
72 Id. at 979.
7 Id.
74 Id. at 980 (emphasis added).
75 Id.
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clear what this even means. Is the court asserting that a child doesn't need
a mother or father? Why does the court use the singular "parent" since
every child has two? Is the court trying to avoid talking about the really
salient issue of family structure, instead focusing on the irrelevant question
of whether a man can be a good parent or a woman or someone who
experiences same-sex attraction? The court concludes this finding with the
very odd statement that its assertion is accepted "without debate in the field
of developmental psychology." Again, so what? Why exclude insights of
sociologists, medical doctors, or whomever else? The next finding is
tricky. It says: "Children do not need to be raised by a male parent and a
female parent to be well-adjusted, and having both a male and female
parent does not increase the likelihood that a child will be well-adjusted." 76
This phrasing allows the court to focus on one uncontroversial but totally
irrelevant point-that some children may do fine without a mother or
father. The key word is "need." By the same token, children don't "need"
any parent at all since some people raised in group homes will turn out
alright. The court does not explain what "well-adjusted" means either.
Evidence indicates that children fare better, on average, in some settings
than others (i.e. they are likely to do better with married parents rather than
cohabiting parents or in an intact family rather than a stepfamily), but the
court does not talk about child outcomes that have been measured, like
educational success, later family formation, etc.. It only mentions the
nebulous term "adjustment" which could merely mean that the children do
not have heightened instances of major psychosis. The discussion could
continue.
Interestingly, the developmental psychologist the court relied on to
support these assertions acknowledged at trial that a number of his earlier
articles noted the importance of fathers in children's development. For
instance, "it is disturbing that there appears to have been a devaluation of
the father's role in western society such that many children may suffer
affective paternal deprivation."77 Some other examples from his early
articles include:
"[b]oys growing up without fathers seem to have problems in the area
of sex role and gender identity development, school performance,
psychosocial adjustment, and perhaps in the control of aggression." 78
76 Id. at 981 (emphasis added).
77 Transcript of Record at 1071, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921 (N.D. CA 2010)
(No. C 09-2292-VRW).
78 Id. at 1079.
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"[b]oys growing up with[out] fathers seem especially prone to exhibit
problems in the areas of sex role and gender identity development." 79
He also wrote about differences between men and women in terms of
parenting: "[t]he data suggests that the differences between maternal and
paternal behavior are more strongly related to either the parents' biological
gender or sex roles, than to either their degree of involvement in infant care
or their attitudes regarding the desirability of paternal involvement in infant
care." 80
This witness also admitted at trial that there are a number of areas in
which a father's absence is meaningful for child outcomes. For instance:
an admission that "[t]he increase in father's absence is particularly
troubling because it is consistently associated with poor school
achievement, diminished involvement in the labor force, early child
bearing, and heightened levels of risk-taking behavior." 81
an admission that boys without fathers are "prone to poor school
performance." 82
an admission that boys without fathers fare worse in terms of
psychosocial adjustment. 83
an admission that there are differences in terms of self control and
delinquent behavior in adolescence between boys with and without
fathers. 84
agreeing "that nurturant fathers may contribute greatly to the
psychological adjustment of their daughters." 85
agreeing that nurturant fathers "may facilitate their [daughters']
happiness in subsequent heterosexual relationships." 86
an admission that there are "some fairly long-term associations
between the quality of the relationship that young children have with
their fathers and the way that they interact as young adults with their
79 Id. at 1074.
80 Id. at 1068.
81 Id. at 1073.
82 Transcript of Record at 1074: 18-19, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-
2292-VRW).
83 Id. at 1074: 21-24.
84 Id. at 1074-75: 25-33.
85 Id. at 1075: 12-15.
86 Id. at 1075: 16-18.
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own peers." 87
In addition, Dr. Lamb admitted at trial that there are differences between
men and women which have implications for child development:
an admission that mothers and fathers are different in a number of
respects, that those differences may be the result of their different
genders, and that being raised by people with such differences is
beneficial for children. 88
an admission that it was an accurate summary of the literature to say
"[r]esearch clearly demonstrates that children growing up with two
continuously married parents are less likely than other children to
experience a wide range of cognitive, emotional, and social problems
not only during childhood but also in adulthood" and that this
"distinction is even stronger if we focus on children growing up with
two happily married biological parents." 89
an admission that it was an accurate summary of the literature to say
"[w]e conclude that in practice the kind of mother-father relationship
most conducive to responsible fathering in contemporary U.S. society
is a caring, committed, collaborative marriage. Outside of this
arrangement, substantial barriers stand in the way of active, involved
fathering." 90
an admission that it was true that children in the average intact
married families do better than children in average single and
stepparent families. 91
an admission that there are differences between men and women: men
are more likely than women to become incarcerated, be involved in
violent altercations, perpetuate sexual abuse, become addicted to
alcohol, and to engage in aggressive behavior; men and women suffer
from different diseases at different times; women tend to live longer
than men; that men are disproportionally represented on the bottom of
the bell curve for cognitive abilities; men are less likely to graduate
high school than women; that men cannot breastfeed; and tmen earn
more money than women. 92
an admission that he had stated, in regards to parenting, that men and
87 Transcript of Record at 1080-81:23-25, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-
2292-VRW).
88 Id. at 1082:8-24.
89 Id. at 1098:3-8, 14-16.
90 Id. 1102:1-7.
91 Id at 1102-03:23-4.
92 Id 1057-58:22-19.
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women are not "completely interchangeable with respect to skills and
abilities." 93
an admission that gender "is one of those variables that can have
ripple effects in a variety of different ways on the way in which people
behave, and can in a variety of ways affect the way they behave with
their children." 94
It is hard to reconcile these statements with the conclusions of the court
which, supposedly, are based on them.
The court's discussion of religion similarly manifests some significantly
questionable conclusions. Finding #77, arguably the most striking of the
lot, says: "Religious beliefs that gay and lesbian relationships are sinful or
inferior to heterosexual relationships harm gays and lesbians." 95 It is hard
to imagine how this could be anything other than a statement of opinion. If
this is true would it not be true that religious beliefs that certain other
religions are untrue would harm them? What can "harm" mean in this
context? Two witnesses cited by the court suggest that religious beliefs
lead to bigotry, but surely more than a mere assertion is needed to establish
such a proposition. The third witness cited says that religious groups block
political progress for gays and lesbians, but this too seems rather
speculative. Why, if this is the case, does the state of California provide all
of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples? Is that not progress as the
witness would define it? Why did religious views not block the enactment
of that law? The next fifteen sources merely relay religious teachings
about non-marital sexual relationships. The court does not clarify how the
existence of these teachings constitutes a legally cognizable harm.
Finding #79 asserts that the campaign for Proposition 8 "relied on fears
that children exposed to the concept of same-sex marriage may become gay
or lesbian." 96 The court, then immediately contradicts this statement by
saying: "[t]he reason children need to be protected from same-sex marriage
was never articulated in official campaign advertisements." 97 Then how
would the court know that this is what the advertisements were saying?
The court says that the ads "insinuated" that hearing about same-sex
marriage would make a child gay "and that parents should dread having a
gay or lesbian child." How does the court know this? Maybe the ads are
93 Transcript of Record at 10064-1065:24-6, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C
09-2292-VRW).
94 Id. at 1065:20-24.
95 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
96 Id. at 988.
97 Id.
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merely raising concerns about the age appropriateness of the topic. This is
likely since a number of instances highlighted in the campaign involve very
young children being taught about same-sex marriage. The charge that the
ads encourage people to "dread" gay children is particularly unfounded. It
seems very likely that many people who voted for Proposition 8 have loved
ones who identify as gay or lesbian. Even those parents who would be
distressed by having the public schools teach that same-sex marriage is a
good idea might still love their children if they were to identify as gay. The
court gives no reason why we should believe otherwise.
Factual problems continue in the legal analysis section. The court, for
instance, says that the definition of marriage as the union of a husband and
wife "exists as an artifact of a time when the genders were seen as having
distinct roles in society and in marriage." 98 Is the court honestly asserting
that marriage would have a different definition if gender roles were
abandoned? According to the court, gender roles were jettisoned with the
advent of no-fault divorce 99 yet all the states retained the male-female
definition of marriage after that change took place. California provided in
its 1850 Constitution that married women could own property but still
understood marriage to require a husband and wife. Surely this "factual"
statement is a stretch. Similarly, the court later says that "the tradition of
gender restrictions arose when spouses were legally required to adhere to
specific gender roles" and Proposition 8 is "nothing more than an artifact of
a foregone notion that men and women fulfill different roles in civic
life." 00 Again, is the court really asserting that same-sex marriage was the
norm until the notion of coverture was developed? Why have societies
without such notions not recognized same-sex marriages? This is an
entirely ahistorical claim. Again, why did same-sex marriage then not
ensue in 1850 in California or in the United States on ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment?
The court also expounds on current realities. Thus: "[g]ender no longer
forms an essential part of marriage." 01 Not surprisingly, the court cites to
no authority for this proposition. It is, in fact, entirely rebutted by the case
since if it were true it would not matter to the plaintiffs that they could
marry only a person of the opposite-sex. They should just, if the court's
logic holds, recognize that gender means nothing to marriage so any gender
98 Id. at 113.
99 Id. at 64 (referencing the court's 28'h finding).
100 Id. at 124.
101 Id. at 113.
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should be permissible in terms of partner selection.
I will highlight one more, somewhat minor, but amusing example. The
decision includes this sentence: "[p]roponents pointed only to a difference
between same-sex couples (who are incapable through sexual intercourse
of producing offspring biologically related to both parties) and opposite-sex
couples (some of whom are capable through sexual intercourse of
producing such offspring)." 02 Given the factual inaccuracies that plague
the rest of the opinion, perhaps one should be grateful that the court is
willing to concede that sexual relationships between people of the same sex
do not result in procreation. What is humorous, though, is the dismissive
phrase about opposite-sex couples: that "some of' them "are capable of
producing offspring through sexual intercourse" related to them both.
Actually it seems that the court could even take judicial notice that lots of
opposite-sex couples are capable of creating children through sexual
intercourse. Perhaps even a large majority.
VI. AD HOMINEM
As this recitation (which if far, far from exhaustive) makes clear, the
more carefully the factual findings are scrutinized, the more threadbare
they appear until it becomes clear that the material the court puts forward to
bolster its conclusion is sheer at best, and that what is most prominent is
naked ad hominem argumentation.
We have already noted the court's guilt by association references to
racial restrictions on marriage and to beliefs about the proper roles of men
and women. These, however, are not the end of accusatory passages that
make up the core of the court's decision-that the fatal flaw in Proposition
is 8 is the motivation of its supporters.
Early in the factual section, the court makes the seemingly irrelevant
statement that the campaign for Proposition 8 was a "'broad coalition' of
individuals and organizations including the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (the 'LDS Church'), the California Catholic Conference
and a large number of evangelical churches." 03 Why are these churches
singled out when the coalition is admittedly "broad?" The court will
return, again and again, to discussions of churches and religion because
ultimately the court will assert that religious involvement in the campaign
is somehow nefarious and taints the constitutionality of the measure.
102 Id. at 122.
103 Id. at 59.
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As the decision comes to a close, the accusations come more frequently.
The court, for instance, claims that the "purported interests" advanced by
Proponents for Proposition 8 "are nothing more than a fear or unarticulated
dislike of same-sex couples."l 04 A few sentences later, the court says,
"Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples are simply
not as good as opposite-sex couples."os On the next page, the court argues
that since it has discredited all of the proffered interests in Proposition 8 all
that "is left is evidence that Proposition 8 enacts a moral view that there is
something 'wrong' with same-sex couples." 106 To the court, the
advertisements in favor of the amendment "ensured California voters
had ... fear-inducing messages in mind." 07 The evidence, the court says,
"conclusively" demonstrates "that Proposition 8 enacts, without reason, a
private moral view that same-sex couples are inferior to opposite-sex
couples."108 Or, as the opinion later says, "Proposition 8 does nothing more
than enshrine in the California Constitution the notion that opposite-sex
couples are superior to same-sex couples." 109 For the court, the "most
likely explanation for its passage" is "a desire to advance the belief that
opposite-sex couples are morally superior to same-sex couples." 10
This is nothing more than an exercise in mind reading. How would it be
possible for the court to know that the voters who approved Proposition 8
"fear" or "dislike" same-sex couples (especially when this "dislike" is
"unarticulated") or think that marriage is a good way to signal their
inferiority? It defies belief to imagine that a social institution recognized
with remarkable consistency across history and across cultures was actually
nothing more than an elaborate homophobic conspiracy.111 To believe this
would require us to imagine that in a state of nature or behind the veil of
ignorance, malign forces assembled to figure out how to prevent gay and
lesbian people from getting their due and came up with the idea of marriage
as the best means for advancing that goal.
Wouldn't it make more sense to just take seriously two basic realities,
one social and the other biological? The biological one is that men and
women are different and that a basic consequence of their difference is that
104 Id. at 132.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 133.
107 Id. at 134.
108 Id. at 135.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 133-34.
Ill Id at 71 (noting that the "concept of an identity based on an object desire ... developed in the
late nineteenth century").
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both are required to create a child. The social reality is that nearly all
human societies have recognized the relationship between a man and a
woman because this relationship alone can result in the creation of
children. The law of Ockham's razor would suggest that this is a more
reasonable explanation than that marriage has existed from time
immemorial as an instrument of oppression. One can disagree that
continuing to recognize marriage as a union of a husband and a wife is a
good idea but one need not assume that only evil motives animate those
with whom you disagree.
This is particularly true for judges whose mission is not to enshrine
policy preferences in our organic law.
CONCLUSION
A fact-sensitive court decision whose facts are at best inadequate, and at
worst, entirely missing, does not prompt confidence in its legal outcome.
In fact, the absence of so much that is necessary to sustain its stunning
conclusions, leads one to conclude that something other than factual
adjudication is at work. In fact, the court's opinion seems to be an
elaborate cover for a predetermined conclusion-marriage is nothing more
than the state's way of giving its stamp of approval to adult relationships.
As the court says, "[t]he state respects an individual's choice to build a
family with anther and protects the relationship because it is so central a
part of an individual's life." 112 This conclusory statement does not, as
would seem appropriate, appear in the fact-finding section of the
decision.' 13 Instead, it is a central part of the court's conclusion that same-
sex marriage is entirely consistent with the history and tradition of the
nation. As novel as such a conclusion is, it does follow from the key
premise. If marriage is nothing more than an adult agreement then all adult
agreements might be marriages.
The real question, however, is whether it is really the province of the
federal courts to endorse such a premise. For now, it is up to reviewing
courts to see through the fabric of faulty facts and shaky conclusions
woven by the district court. If it can do so, Proposition 8 will stand.
112 Id.at lll.
113 Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
Interestingly, the only authority cited for the proposition is a dissenting opinion written by Justice
Blackmun.
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